Safeguarding United States Animal Industries Against Incursion of Foreign Animal Diseases
American Association of Zoo Veterinarians Conference 2004
Richard C. Cambre, DVM
Veterinary Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Miami Animal Import Center, Miami Springs, FL, USA

Abstract

The Veterinary Services (VS) Strategic Plan of the United States Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA APHIS) lists “Safeguard the U.S. from the occurrence of adverse animal health events.” as Goal 1.3 “Exclusion,” or prevention of foreign animal disease entry into the country through ports and across borders, is a front-line effort in the overall safeguarding plan. A survey of stakeholders representing commodity, trade and other industry groups along with responsible state agencies revealed that human travel, animal product imports and the importation of exotic birds represented the highest risks of animal disease introduction in their minds. U.S. Customs Service figures for FY 2000 list 489,000,000 passengers and pedestrians crossing U.S. Borders, and almost 140,000,000 conveyances including trucks, buses, ships, aircraft and cars. The volume is expected to double by 2009.2

Keeping the animal industries of our country free of foreign pathogens is a multi-agency federal and state government effort that depends upon the cooperation of the various industries themselves. The effort attempts to balance plant and animal issues, and encompasses much more than just border and port inspections. The Animal Health Safeguarding Review, Results and Recommendations (2001) states “Effective exclusion activities are a continuum from the gathering of international animal health information and trade negotiations through the promulgation of import regulations, review of import requests, and the physical inspection activities at ports of entry; to domestic surveillance and monitoring systems which include field and laboratory infrastructure designed to detect the incursion of foreign animal disease.”2

It is no longer just an agricultural issue. Threats of bio- or agri-terrorism have made U.S. biosecurity a national, military, and food security issue. Beyond the well-documented economic devastation caused to food animal producing industries in major disease outbreaks, free-ranging and captive wildlife populations, commercial animal populations, and companion animal populations are all at risk. In 2001 the U.S. livestock industry was estimated to be worth about $100 billion. The poultry industry alone has suffered losses estimated at as much as $12,000,000 per week in international trade interruptions resulting from recent avian influenza (AI) outbreaks in the Northeast and other parts of the country, most of which were low pathogenic AI strains. Some diseases harbor zoonotic potential, making their introduction by whatever means a public health concern as well.

Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, many of the port inspection activities of passengers and animal product shipments were conducted by the Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) division of USDA APHIS, in collaboration with U.S. Customs Service officers. These were the people you saw at airports or seaports when entering the country. In March 2003, DHS established the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) division, absorbing the majority of USDA’s PPQ employees nationwide, along with their responsibilities and functions.

Veterinary Services maintains a presence at major border crossings and air and sea ports through which live animals enter the country. Livestock species and most types of birds are subject to import quarantine. There are three major Animal Import Centers in the United States. The New York Animal Import Center (NYAIC, Newburgh, NY) and the Miami Animal Import Center (MAIC, Miami, FL) are both fully staffed and operated by USDA employees. The Animal Import Center in Los Angeles, CA is privately owned and operated, but overseen by Veterinary Services personnel. In addition, USDA operates a bird quarantine station in San Ysidro, CA. Ruminants and swine are held in quarantine for a minimum of 30 days, horses for 3, 7, or 60 days (depending on country of origin and its endemic diseases). Birds remain in quarantine for 30 days, except for smuggled birds, which stay a minimum of 45 days. During their quarantine, animals “…shall be subject to such inspections, disinfection, blood tests, or other tests as may be determined by the administrator, to determine their freedom from disease.”1

In addition to USDA-operated facilities, approved, privately owned and operated quarantines for “commercial” birds (intended for zoos, conservation, or pet trade) are located in port cities such as Los Angeles, New York and Miami. These facilities are carefully inspected and monitored on a daily basis by USDA Veterinary Medical Officers or Animal Health Technicians. In the summer and fall of 2003, exotic newcastle disease (END, formerly known as VVND) was identified by virus isolation from cloacal swabs in three different private commercial bird quarantines, prompting depopulation of nearly 6,000 birds, some of which were headed to zoos around the country.

USDA APHIS VS recognizes its responsibility to global conservation efforts of endangered and threatened species. Every effort is made to return such species to their country of origin in cases where they are cohorts in shipments of disease-positive birds but are themselves negative. In rare instances, such species have been allowed to enter the United States after extended quarantine and repeated negative testing. A recent example (summer 2003) involved four juvenile jabiru storks (Jabiru mycteria) that had the misfortune of sharing a private commercial bird quarantine with African hornbills that were END-positive.

Since publication of the Safeguarding Review in October 2001, there have been major outbreaks of AI in the Northeast and Texas, END in California and parts of the Southwest, and a single case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Washington State whose political and financial ramifications are still being felt. These outbreaks have strained the agency, requiring diversion of personnel and resources away from safeguarding and other duties. Despite this, USDA is dedicated to implementing fully the recommendations of the Safeguarding Review, including major improvements in funding, staffing, training, information technology and physical facilities.

Literature Cited

1.  Code of Federal Regulations. Title 9 (Animals and Animal Products). Part 93. 2003. Importation of Certain Animals, Birds and Poultry, and Certain Animal, Bird and Poultry Products; Requirements for Means of Conveyance and Shipping Containers. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Pp. 367–477.

2.  National Association of State Departments of Agriculture Research Foundation. 2001. The Animal Health Safeguarding Review, Results and Recommendations. Washington, D.C.: 1-6, 33–50.

3.  United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services. 2001. Veterinary Services Strategic and Performance Plan. FY2002-FY2004. Pp. 4–7.

 

Speaker Information
(click the speaker's name to view other papers and abstracts submitted by this speaker)

Richard C. Cambre, DVM
Veterinary Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
United States Department of Agriculture
Miami Animal Import Center
Miami Springs, FL, USA


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